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Security Aspects of the Authentication Used
in Quantum Cryptography
Jörgen Cederlöf and Jan-Åke Larsson
Abstract—Unconditionally secure message authentication is an impor-
tant part of quantum cryptography (QC). In this correspondence, we an-
alyze security effects of using a key obtained from QC for authentication
purposes in later rounds of QC. In particular, the eavesdropper gains par-
tial knowledge on the key in QC that may have an effect on the security of
the authentication in the later round. Our initial analysis indicates that this
partial knowledge has little effect on the authentication part of the system,
in agreement with previous results on the issue. However, when taking the
full QC protocol into account, the picture is different. By accessing the
quantum channel used in QC, the attacker can change the message to be
authenticated. This, together with partial knowledge of the key, does incur
a security weakness of the authentication. The underlying reason for this is
that the authentication used, which is insensitive to such message changes
when the key is unknown, becomes sensitive when used with a partially
known key. We suggest a simple solution to this problem, and stress usage
of this or an equivalent extra security measure in QC.
Index Terms—Authentication, quantum cryptography (QC), quantum
key distribution, quantum key growing (QKG).
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography (QC), or more accurately quantum key
growing (QKG), uses properties of quantum mechanical systems to
share a secret key between two sites. QKG was first proposed in 1984
[1] and there are several variations on the theme today [2]–[4]. Be-
cause there are excellent descriptions of these systems elsewhere (e.g.,
[4]), we will only outline the generic steps of a QKG algorithm here,
and then focus on the authentication used. The security of QKG is
based on laws of nature [5]–[7] rather than computational complexity
as is usually the case for key-sharing systems [8], and therefore, we
will here not assume that there are any bounds to the computational
capacity of the attacker.
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We will use common-practice terminology and refer to the sender,
receiver, and eavesdropper as Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. To set
up a QKG system Alice and Bob need a “quantum channel” between
them where they can send and receive, or share, quantum systems, e.g.,
“quantum bits” (qubits). One example is an optical fiber carrying single
photons with the qubit coded in the photon’s polarization, but there are
many other possibilities. In a perfect channel, every qubit sent by Alice
is received and correctly measured by Bob, and Bob receives no qubits
which Alice has not sent. In practice, such channels do not exist. A
real-world channel can lose almost all qubits in transit, make Bob think
he received qubits never sent by Alice, and modify some of the qubits
that do go from Alice to Bob. However, a perfect channel is not needed.
As long as the errors are within some limits, QKG will still produce a
key that is both shared and secret [4], [9]–[14].
They will also need a classical communication channel. The alterna-
tives include but are not limited to the Internet, the same optical fiber
used above, and a network cable parallel to the optical fiber. Often in
this context, a simplifying assumption is used that the classical channel
can be eavesdropped on, but not be modified by Eve. Unfortunately,
unmodifiable channels do not exist in the real world, so message au-
thentication must be used to allow Alice and Bob to detect Eve’s mod-
ification attempts. To be able to authenticate, Alice and Bob will need
a (small) shared secret key to start with.
The purpose of the QKG system is to use the two channels and a
small portion of the already shared key to generate new key portion,
larger than the one just used. The initial key only needs to be large
enough to allow for the first generation sequence, typically to authen-
ticate two messages, one from Alice to Bob and one in the other di-
rection. This will enable the key to grow somewhat (QKG), and will
allow for further runs, in which the key will grow even more. A round
consists of a number of steps.
1) Raw key generation: Use the quantum channel to transmit/gen-
erate a bit sequence, shared between Alice and Bob but equal only
in a portion of the positions. The size of this portion depends on
the protocol used, properties of the channel, and whether Eve is
listening on the quantum channel.
2) Sifting: Remove most of the bits that do not match by comparing
parameters of each use of the quantum channel, the “settings.”
This will discard noisy bits without sending any information about
the value of the bits on the classical channel. A smaller “sifted”
key is obtained which is equal for Alice and Bob in a consider-
ably larger portion, the size of which depends on properties of the
channel and whether Eve is listening.
3) Error correction, or key reconciliation [15]: Perform error correc-
tion on the sifted key and estimate the error rate to detect whether
Eve was listening on the quantum channel, either with a few sac-
rificed bits from the sifted key, or with some of the sifted-out bits
from the last step, depending on details of the protocol. If the error
rate is above a predetermined bound, Alice and Bob conclude that
Eve has been listening and the round must be aborted.
4) Privacy amplification [16]–[18]: If the noise is lower than the
predetermined bound, Eve may still have been listening but in
that case she has opted to only extract very little information. In
this case, Alice and Bob can perform “privacy amplification” to
lower Eve’s information even further, sacrificing a few bits of their
candidate key in the process.
5) Authentication [19]–[21]: The final step of each round is to au-
thenticate the messages sent from Alice to Bob and from Bob to
Alice on the classical channel, to make sure Eve has not modi-
fied these messages. The sender uses key bits from the previously
shared secret key to create an authentication tag from the message.
The used key bits are then discarded. The tag is sent along with
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the message and the recipient uses his copy of the key to generate
another tag from the received message. If the tags are identical,
the message is accepted as authentic and the new key just gener-
ated is added to the remaining key from the last round. If the au-
thentication fails, Eve is assumed to be trying to interfere and the
round should be aborted. (A complication is the fact that the error
correction is not perfect. An error can, with a small probability,
sneak through. If that error is in the key used for authentication in
a later round, the authentication will fail even without Eve being
present.)
There are variations in the details but all QKG protocols contain
these main steps. Eve’s presence is detected via high error rate on the
quantum channel in step 3) or failure of authentication on the clas-
sical channel in step 5). If the authentication step is not performed, all
QKG protocols are susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack, where
Eve would impersonate Bob when communicating with Alice and
vice versa. Even when performing authentication, one broken round
will provide Eve with the authentication key for a subsequent round
and can break that too, and so on for all future rounds. We will ex-
amine the authentication step of the protocols in some more detail
here and show that it is also sensitive to the choice of the message to
be authenticated.
II. AUTHENTICATION
In QKG, the standard is to use Wegman–Carter authentication
[19]–[21]. This is the authentication equivalent of the Vernam cipher
(the one-time pad; see, e.g., [22]), for which all messages are equally
likely if the key is unknown. In Wegman–Carter authentication, all
values of the tag are equally likely if the key is unknown, and even if
one message–tag pair is known, all values of the tag corresponding to
another message still are (almost) equally likely. A tag is shorter than
a message, so in comparison, just guessing a tag will be more likely
to succeed than the corresponding guess of a message in the Vernam
cipher. Nevertheless, given a sufficiently long tag length, the proba-
bility of correctly guessing the tag will be very low in Wegman–Carter
authentication. That is, the probability of generating the correct tag for
a forged message will be very low.
In the Vernam cipher, the required key needs to be at least as long
as the message to be encrypted. Fortunately, in Wegman–Carter au-
thentication, the required key grows only logarithmically with the mes-
sage length. This is essential for QKG as it is then only a matter of
making the rounds large enough to gain more key than is lost in the
authentication.
Formally, the fundamental building block of Wegman–Carter au-
thentication is called universal families of hash functions,1 a familyH
of functions that map a message in the set of possible messages M to
a tag in the set of tags T . The following formal definition of the appro-
priate family of hash functions is taken from [21].
Definition 1 (-almost strongly universal2(   ASU2) hash func-
tions): Let M and T be finite sets and call functions from M to T
hash functions. Let  be a positive real number. A set H of hash func-
tions is -almost strongly universal2 if the following two conditions are
satisfied.
1) The number of hash functions in H that takes an arbitrary m1 2
M to an arbitrary t1 2 T is exactly jHj=jT j.
1A word of warning is perhaps appropriate regarding terminology, as these
hash functions are quite different from “cryptographically secure hash func-
tions” sometimes mentioned in connection with authentication. It is impossible
to construct unbreakable cryptographically secure hash functions (see, e.g.,
[23]). They have similarities and both deserve to be called hash functions,
but the individual hash functions of Wegman–Carter are not, and need not be,
cryptographically secure in the classical sense.
Fig. 1. In Wegman–Carter authentication, a given message m organizes the
keys k into subsets that each map the message to one value of the tag t =
h (m), and these subsets are of equal size (for an -ASU family of hash func-
tions). That is, to Eve, the keyK is completely unknown (uniformly distributed),
and therefore, so is the tag T = h (m ) for her message m .
2) The fraction of those functions that also takes an arbitrary m2 6=
m1 inM to an arbitrary t2 2 T (possibly equal to t1) is no more
than .
The parameter  controls a tradeoff between the size of H and the
probability to guess the correct tag. The lower bound of  = 1=jT j
can be achieved if a large family can be tolerated, and Wegman and
Carter included several such examples in [19]. Those families are too
large to be usable in QKG, but Wegman and Carter later showed [20]
that by just doubling the possibility of a correct guess, a much smaller
2=jT j-ASU2 family can be constructed. That family is small enough
for QKG, and although there are many other similar families, the exact
choice is not important and we will use their original example from
[20].
In formal language, the authentication proceeds as follows. Alice
and Bob share a secret key k just large enough to select a hash function
hk 2 H; 0  k < jHj. Alice wants Bob to have the message mA 2
M and sends both mA and tA = hk(mA). Bob verifies that tA really
equals hk(mA) and accepts the message as authentic if it does. The
key k is then discarded and never reused.
Let us now introduce Eve who has control over the channel between
Alice and Bob and wants Bob to accept a faked message mE 2 M.
To her the secret key is a random variable K uniform over its whole
range 0  K < jHj. If the key is a random variable, so is the tag for
her message TE = hK(mE). The first condition of Definition 1 says
that if K is uniform over its whole range, so is TE (see Fig. 1). Eve can
take a guess, but any guess t is correct only with the probability
P (TE = t) = 1=jT j: (1)
Eve may also wait until Alice tries to send an authenticated message
to Bob, pick up the message and the tag, and make sure Bob never sees
them. With bothmA and tA = hK(mA) at her disposal, she can, given
enough computing power, rule out all keys that do not match and be
left with just 1=jT j of the keys to guess from; see Fig. 2. However, the
second condition of Definition 1 says that even with this knowledge,
any tag value t guessed by Eve is correct (equal to the correct tag TE )
for her mE 6= mA (with K uniform over its whole range) at best with
the probability
P (TE = t j hK(mA) = tA)  : (2)
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Fig. 2. In Wegman–Carter authentication, a given message–tag pair corre-
sponds to one subset of keys that map the message onto that tag value. A
different message induces a different family of subsets, and will spread out the
remaining keys so that all tag values have a probability less than or equal to 
(for an -ASU family of hash functions, if the keys are equally probable).
The parameter  is clearly an upper limit on the probability that Eve
makes the right guess and manages to fool Bob into accepting a fake
message, at least if Eve knows nothing about the key beforehand.
In fact, Wegman–Carter authentication is cryptographically secure
in the following way: the probability of Eve guessing the tag value for
her message mE does not depend on which message mA Alice sends,
as long as it is not equal to Eve’s message mE . The probability is al-
ways less than , independently of mA, or put in other words, there
are no message–tag pairs from Alice that are significantly weaker than
others. Even if Eve was allowed to choosemA (different frommE ) and
was given the tag for that message, she would not be in an improved
situation in regards to the tag TE corresponding to her message mE .
This may not seem important at this point, but will prove to be inter-
esting later.
If Eve tries to break the authentication in the above scenario and
fails, her presence will be detected and the QKG round will be aborted.
A complicating factor is that the authentication can fail from time to
time without Eve because of channel noise, so Eve can try to break
the authentication, but to avoid raising suspicion, she should only do
this seldom. The parameter  should be chosen so that even if Eve does
this, the expected life of the system is long enough for Alice’s and
Bob’s needs. For the 2=jT j-ASU2 family from [20], a 32-bit tag would
give a probability of 2 31 to generate the correct tag after having seen
a message–tag pair. On average, Eve would need 231  2:1  109
attempts. If one extra failure of the authentication, e.g., every 10 s, is
not detectable, it would take on average 680 years to guess the correct
tag. This would be long enough for most uses.
Fig. 3. Eve’s information on the key will induce a nonuniform distribution on
k, and also on t. (a) Nonuniform distribution on k induces a nonuniform distri-
bution on t. (b) Distribution can be very skew, for instance, if Eve holds infor-
mation that allows her to rule out some keys entirely.
III. PARTIALLY KNOWN KEY
In the previous section, we have assumed that Eve has no information
on the secret key used in the authentication, i.e., to Eve, the key K was
a random variable uniform over its whole range. This is an unrealistic
requirement in QKG. Information leakage in the quantum transmission
phase is unavoidable but the damage can be reduced by using privacy
amplification, which will reduce Eve’s knowledge of the key signifi-
cantly, but not all the way to nothing. As soon as the whole preshared
key is used, Alice and Bob will have to start trusting authentication
with a key that is not completely secret.
If Eve has some information on the key, obtained from earlier rounds
of the QKG protocol, but has not seen any message–tag pair (as de-
picted in Fig. 3), an upper bound for the chance that Eve’s generated,
or guessed, tag value t is correct is the sum of probabilities for the
jHj=jT j most probable keys. The appropriate bound for Eve’s knowl-
edge on the key is given by the min entropy
H1(K) = min
k
(  log
2
P (K = k)): (3)
For a given value of the min entropy, the chance of a correctly guessed
tag value is maximized if the probabilities P (K = k) are all equal.
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This occurs when Eve uses all her information to eliminate some keys,
and we denote the remaining keys
HE = H n fh1; . . . ; hng: (4)
This means that from her perspective the true key is drawn from the
remaining jHE j = rjHj keys with equal probability [i.e., H1(K) =
log
2
rjHj; see Fig. 3(b)]. We arrive at
P (TE = t) 
jHj=jT j
1
1
rjHj
=
1
rjT j
: (5)
The probability of a correct guess increases, but only a little if the pa-
rameter r is close to 1. If Eve knows nothing about the key, her key
(min)entropy equals the size of the key, and the probability is (bounded
by) 1=jT j as expected.
Now, when Eve has a little knowledge on the key and picks up a
message–tag pair, she again gains additional information that increases
her knowledge about the key. The message–tag pair mA+ tA that Eve
receives from Alice identifies a subset of keys (hash functions) of size
jHj=jT j from which the key must have been drawn
Ht = fh 2 H : h(mA) = tAg: (6)
Given that the set of possible keys is HE rather than H, the final set of
possible keys is notHt butHt \HE . In the extreme case, when only
one key remains in this subset, Eve will know which key was used by
Alice, and in this case, she can simply create a tag using the identified
key. However, it is also possible to use the result if more than one key
is present in Ht \HE as in Fig. 4. More specifically, when
jHt \HE j  jHj=jT j (7)
there may exist messages m that are such that
8h1; h2 2 Ht \HE ; h1(m) = h2(m): (8)
That is, for this message, all remaining keys map to the same tag. The
maximum number jHj=jT j is given in requirement 2) in Definition 1.
The number of messages with this property will increase as jHt \
HE j decreases from jHj=jT j. If one of these messages coincides with
mE , Eve can successfully break the authentication. She may not know
exactly which key k was drawn but she knows enough to create the
correct tag tE = hk(mE) for her message.
Even when her preferred messagemE does not coincide with one of
the above messages, Eve has some freedom in choosing mE and may
be able to adjust her message so that she can use the above technique.
The worst possible case is when Eve can choose her message mE so
that she can generate the correct tag tE for it as soon as (7) holds.
We will restrict ourselves to deal with this worst case scenario here
and assume that Eve is able to do just this; see further comments in
Section VI. This assumption also implies that even if jHt \ HE j >
jHj=jT j, she can choose her message mE , so that jHj=jT j of the
key values in Ht \ HE give the correct tag for her message. The
probability of generating the correct tag given these two sources of
information is bounded by
P (TE = tjK 2 Ht \HE) 
jHj=jT j
jHt \HE j
: (9)
Before Eve has seen the tag tA, her chance of success is
P (TE = t j K 2 HE)
=
jT j
=1
P (K 2 H \HE) P (TE = tjK 2 H \HE)

jT j
=1
jH \HE j
rjHj

jHj=jT j
jH \HE j
=

r
: (10)
Fig. 4. If Eve can rule out certain keys with her very limited information, it
may happen that Alice’s message-tag pair allows Eve to rule out all keys except
for a few that map her message to the same tag. She can now send her message
and that tag, knowing that Bob will accept it. There is no risk whatsoever that
Bob will detect her.
The increase in probability from (2) is small if r is close to 1; this
suggests that the system is secure (see, also, [24]).
However, if Eve gets to see both message and tag before she must
decide whether to replace them with her own, the average probability
in (10) is not appropriate for comparison with the bound in (2). In-
stead, the bound in (9) should be used. But that bound is not a bound:
the right-hand side reaches 1 if there remain at most jHj=jT j keys in
Ht \HE . In this situation, Eve has information at hand that enables
her to determine whether her attack will be successful, before she has
replaced the message–tag pair. She may now choose to replace the mes-
sage–tag pair for her own only in those cases when she knows she will
be successful, and remain undetected when she is uncertain of success.
The full attack would be as follows: Eve can choose to tap the
quantum channel in such a way that the disturbance is below the noise
limit set by Alice and Bob. Her aim is not to use the information
she gathers to decode messages sent with the generated key, but to
break the authentication of the QKG system. She then intercepts each
message–tag pair sent by Alice and uses the additional information
provided by the pair to determine the tag for her forged message. She
will only be successful occasionally, when the following occurs:
1) the message mA sent by Alice is such that at least one of the
subsets depicted in Fig. 4 contain less than jHj=jT j keys;
2) the key, randomly drawn to Eve, ends up in such a subset.
Because Eve can determine when the attack is successful, i.e., when
the remaining keys all map her message to the same tag, she will only
replace Alice’s message–tag pair on the classical channel when she
is certain of success. As long as Eve stays passive she does not risk
detection, and she actively replaces the message–tag pair only when
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her tag is correct. This attack is possible to perform each round, instead
of the sparse attempts that the previously mentioned guessing strategy
allowed.
In what follows, to simplify the analysis, we will assume that Eve
performs the active replacement only when she is certain of success,
even though this is not strictly necessary. Eve’s probability of success is
bounded by (9), and it would be possible to devise a more complicated
guessing strategy to be used by Eve when it is less than one, but that is
beyond the scope of this correspondence.
IV. SECURITY?
Let us assess the severity of this threat by estimating the probability
that Eve receives the right message–tag pair given only a little infor-
mation on the key. First, we will also assume that Eve can do nothing
more than remove keys essentially at random with her initial knowl-
edge of the key. The message–tag pair that Eve receives corresponds
to drawing jHj=jT j keys fromH without returning them. The true key
will always be present in the drawn keys (and is, of course, one of the
remaining possible keys), while the other jHj=jT j   1 keys are drawn
from jHj   1 keys of which rjHj   1 are “possible,” i.e., belong to
HE . The number of drawn possible keys X is a random variable, and
removing the true key, the random variable (X   1) will be hypergeo-
metrically distributed
(X   1) 2 Hyp jHj   1;
jHj
jT j
  1;
rjHj   1
jHj   1
: (11)
In other words
P (X = i) =
rjHj   1
i  1
jHj   rjHj
jHj=jT j   i
jHj   1
jHj=jT j   1
: (12)
The interesting case is when the number of keys drawn is less than
jHj=jT j, or
P X  
jHj
jT j
=
jHj=jT j
i=1
rjHj   1
i  1
jHj   rjHj
jHj=jT j   i
jHj   1
jHj=jT j   1
: (13)
This probability is complicated to evaluate but can be estimated
using the Chebyshev inequality
P (jX   j  c)  1=c2 (14)
which is rather loose, but generally valid, and will be sufficient for our
purposes here. It yields
P X  
jHj
jT j
= P  X    
jHj
jT j
 P jX   j    
jHj
jT j
= P jX   j 
  
jHj
jT j



2
  
jHj
jT j
2
: (15)
In our case, the mean value is
 =
jHj
jT j
  1
rjHj   1
jHj   1
+ 1 (16)
and the standard deviation is
 =
jHj
jT j
  1
rjHj   1
jHj   1
1 
rjHj   1
jHj   1
jHj   jHj=jT j
jHj   2
:
(17)
This simplifies considerably in the asymptotic regime
rjHj  rjHj=jT j  1 (18)
where we have
 = r
jHj
jT j
and  = r(1  r) jHj
jT j
(19)
which means that
P X  
jHj
jT j

r(1  r)
jHj
jT j
r
jHj
jT j
  
jHj
jT j
2
=
r(1  r)jT j
(r   )2jHj
: (20)
Further, when r  , this simplifies to
P X  
jHj
jT j

1  r
r
jT j
jHj
: (21)
In practice, the right-hand constant is very small. The 2=jT j-ASU2
hash family from [20] is of size
jHj = jT j4 log log jMj (22)
e.g., for a 100-kbit message and a 32-bit tag, this translates to
jHj  232417 = 22176 (23)
i.e., roughly 2 kbit of key used. If Eve is allowed to have, e.g., 1/8-bit
initial knowledge of the key (so that r  0:917), her chance to break the
system without fearing detection is less than 3:510 647 each round.
At 1000 rounds/s, Eve’s expected time to break the system would be
at least 10635 years, much longer than when just guessing once every
10 s. Remember that using this approach, Eve does not guess the tag
value but only tries to break the system when she is certain of success.
Again, this seems to suggest the same as above; even if Eve has a little
information on the key used for authentication, her chances at breaking
the authentication do not increase substantially. However, Eve can do
more than just wait for the right message–tag pair to arrive; she may
have a cunning plan.
V. POSSIBLE ATTACK
Eve’s main obstacle above is the Chebyshev inequality. Viewed in
another manner, the central limit theorem ensures that most of the sub-
sets will, with high probability, contain a number of remaining keys
very close to rjHj=jT j  jHj=jT j. Eve’s chances of breaking the
authentication would increase dramatically if the remaining keys were
split into subsets of only two kinds: with either jHj=jT j or jHj=jT j
keys in each subset. This will change the probability distribution dis-
cussed above, so that the argument that used the Chebyshev inequality
does not apply anymore. Eve would then be able to break the authenti-
cation if the correct key would happen to fall in a subset with jHj=jT j
remaining keys, since we assume that Eve has enough freedom to gen-
erate a message–tag pair of her own as soon as this happens.
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Fig. 5. Eve may be able to influence the message from Alice to arrange for
subsets of two kinds, either with jHj=jT j remaining key values (on the left
in the figure) or jHj=jT j remaining key values (on the right), to have as many
subsets as possible with jHj=jT j remaining key values.
There are a few methods that Eve could use to arrange the subsets to
her liking, but the easiest method would be to change the message: the
message from Alice to Bob contains a lot of data that describes what
has happened on the quantum channel. Eve can access and change what
happens on the quantum channel. In essence, Eve has some influence on
the content of the message that Alice sends, and as a consequence, Eve
can change the subsets. Note that this attack would use a different type
of changes on the quantum channel than those caused by Eve extracting
information from it, and need not be detectable as an increased noise
level in the reconciliation step of the protocol. The attack is different
in its aim since it is not intended to increase Eve’s information on the
key, but rather to maximize the usefulness of the information she has
obtained in a previous round. Assuming that Eve does this as best as she
can, the subsets may well be such that there remains either jHj=jT j
or jHj=jT j keys in each subset (see Fig. 5).
In this situation, the probability of success is instead the probability
that the correct key ends up in one of the subsets with jHj=jT j re-
maining keys in it. The number of such subsets are
n =
] eliminated keys
] eliminated keys in a “good” subset
=
(1  r)jHj
(1  )jHj=jT j
(24)
and the probability of ending up in such a subset is
P X  
jHj
jT j
=
] possible keys in “good” subsets
] possible keys
=
njHj=jT j
rjHj
=
1  r
r

1  
: (25)
The change in probability distribution gives a dramatic increase in
probability from the bound in (21) to the value in (25). The difference
between jT j=jHj and =(1  ) is immense for our 2=jT j-ASU2 hash
family, since (22) gives
jT j
jHj
=
1
jT j4 log log jMj 1

2
jT j
=  <

1  
: (26)
In our example, using a 2=jT j-ASU2 hash family, a 32-bit tag and
1/8-bit initial knowledge of the key (so that r  0:9170), the prob-
ability of success is  4:2  10 11. Again, at 1000 rounds/s, Eve’s
expected time to break the system would be just nine months—nine
months to break that QKG system without risk of detection. The im-
mense difference between the two expected times above suggests that
this is a problem even when Eve is not able to obtain the ideal subsets.
The real theoretical reason for the existence of this attack is that
Wegman–Carter authentication with a partially known key is not cryp-
tographically secure in the way discussed in Section II, concerning
Wegman–Carter authentication with a completely secret key. Here, the
probability of Eve guessing the tag value for her message mE does de-
pend on which message mA Alice sends (even when it is not equal to
Eve’s message mE ). In other words, there are message–tag pairs from
Alice that are weaker than others. In QKG, Eve can influence mA via
the quantum channel and is given the tag for that message, and this will
improve her situation in regards to the determination of the correct tag
tE corresponding to her message mE .
It is clear that simply sending the tag along with the message to prove
authenticity does not work in the long run if Eve has a small but nonzero
knowledge of the authentication key used and can influence the mes-
sage Alice wants to send. The little information carried by the tag can
be enough together with what Eve already has, to make Eve certain that
her attack will be successful. The probability of this happening in a run
is small but Eve can wait, not trying to break the authentication until
she is sure of success.
VI. PREVENTION
To prevent Eve from breaking the QKG system, Alice and Bob may
adjust the parameter choices of jT j and thereby  by using a larger tag,
or r by requiring more privacy amplification. The intent is to decrease
the probability in (25), i.e., to make the expected time-of-life of the
system long enough to suit their taste. Doing this will use up more key
in the authentication, and/or require them to sacrifice more key during
privacy amplification. The key production rate of such a system will be
lowered, and given the meager output of the systems used today, this is
probably not desirable. Minimizing this effect would require a detailed
analysis of each individual QKG protocol.
A simpler, more efficient, and generic fix would be to delay the
second transfer of information to Eve so that she has to make the de-
cision to try to break the authentication before she knows if she will
succeed, i.e., before she has received the tag. The most obvious way to
do this is to force Eve to send the message (Alice’s or her own) to Bob
before she gets hold of the tag.
One solution is using synchronized clocks and sending messages and
tags at preagreed times, with a pause longer than the precisions of the
clocks. Synchronized clocks are already recommended for other secu-
rity purposes in present QKG systems; problems with this approach are
discussed in [11].
Another and in our opinion better solution that does not need clocks
is the following.
1) Alice sends her message mA; Bob receives a message m.
2) Bob draws and sends a “salt” sB , a random number drawn from
a set at least as large as the set of hash functions 0  sB < jT j;
Alice receives a salt s.
3) Alice calculates a tag based on the concatenation of her message
and the received saltmA+s and sends that tag tA = hk(mA+s);
Bob receives a tag t and checks the authentication by comparing
t and hk(m + sB).
The length of the salt should be at least the tag length because it should
be equally difficult to guess as the tag. This would increase the “mes-
sage length” of the concatenation that is used in the tag generation, but
the effect is negligible because the original message is much longer
than the tag, and the key used increases logarithmically with the “mes-
sage length.”
When faced with this situation, Eve must decide whether to attack
without knowing if she will be successful. If she does decide to attack,
there are two ways to proceed:
1) to directly send her message mE to Bob and either sB or a faked
salt sE to Alice;
2) to delay sending her message to Bob and send a faked salt sE to
Alice. This will allow her to adjust her message mE before she
sends it to Bob.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 54, NO. 4, APRIL 2008 1741
Note that, in both cases 1) and 2), Eve needs to actively replace the
message and/or the salt on the classical channel before she receives the
tag from Alice—the tag that carries the extra information Eve needs to
determine if her attack will be successful. In this situation, the expres-
sion in (10) is the proper bound, and we have restored security.
We mentioned earlier in this correspondence that we assume the
worst case scenario where Eve is able to break the authentication pro-
vided just that (7) holds. A full analysis of this would necessarily incor-
porate details of the QKG protocol, including properties of the -ASU2
family, but we note that the countermeasure presented here, using a salt,
is very simple and generic and reestablishes security without the need
for such an intricate analysis of each individual QKG protocol.
VII. CONCLUSION
To conclude, even though Wegman–Carter authentication seems se-
cure when used with a partially known key (see, also, [24]), the usual
implementation of a QKG system contains an additional subtlety. Eve
can influence the message to be sent, and together with partial knowl-
edge of the key, this opens up Eve’s possibilities. Fortunately, a simple
remedy exists: force Eve to make her attack before she knows that it
will succeed, by making sure Alice will not send the authentication
tag until either Bob has received the message or Eve has attempted
breaking the system. A real-world implementation of a QKG system
might also make it difficult for Eve because 1) Eve’s freedom to change
the messages to be authenticated might be too limited, and 2) a round
normally consists of a dialogue of several messages and an authenti-
cation tag for all of them at the very end of the round. Whether this is
enough to keep the system secure depends on the details of the system,
but implementing the solution proposed here is cheap and requires no
deep analysis of the system. We would, therefore, recommend doing
just that in future QKG systems.
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